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Nature and Grace in Bavinck 
Translated from J. Veenhof,  (Amsterdam, 1968), 345-365.
Editor’s Note:  As stated below, this paper is Dr. Al Wolters’ “translation of twenty pages from Dr. Jan Veenhof’s disserta-
tion on Bavinck, titled Revelatie en Inspiratie.” Dr. Veenhof succeeded G. C. Berkouwer in the chair for dogmatic theology 
at the Free University in Amsterdam, then went on to teach at the universities of Basel and Bern and for one semester at 
Calvin Theological Seminary.  As emeritus, he is still involved in theological and pastoral work. 
by Jan Veenhof
Dr. Al Wolters is Professor of Religion/Theology and 
Classical languages at Redeemer University College, 
Ancaster, Ontario.  The second edition of his Creation 
Regained was published in 2005.
translated by
A.M. Wolters
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Translator’s Preface
Herman Bavinck (1854-l92l) was a noted 
Reformed theologian, chieﬂ y known for his four-
volume Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (second edition, 
1906-l911). He is one of the two giants (next to 
Abraham Kuyper) of the great revival of Calvinism 
(sometimes called Neocalvinism) in nineteenth-
century Holland. In his later years he also pub-
lished extensively in the ﬁ elds of philosophy, psy-
chology, and educational theory, and he was active 
in politics. 
The present paper is a translation of twenty 
pages from Jan Veenhof’s dissertation on Bavinck, 
titled Revelatie en Inspiratie (Amsterdam: Buijten en 
Schipperheijn, 1968). Veenhof was the successor of 
G.C. Berkouwer in the chair for dogmatic theol-
ogy at the Free University in Amsterdam. His dis-
sertation is a massive, 700-page work which treats 
Bavinck’s doctrine of revelation in the context both 
of Bavinck’s thought as a whole and of the compet-
ing theological currents of his day, especially the 
so-called “ethical” movement.
Within this much broader scope, the pages 
on nature and grace are only a small sub-section. 
Nevertheless, they are of pivotal importance, since 
they deal with what has been called “the central 
theme of Bavinck’s thought.” They bring together, 
in short compass, Bavinck’s major statements on 
this theme, and they are put in context by a scholar 
who can lay claim to being one of today’s leading 
authorities on Bavinck.
However, these pages are of interest not just for 
students of Bavinck’s theology: Bavinck ’s state-
ment of the basic thesis that grace restores nature, 
or that salvation means the restoration of creation, 
is of far wider signiﬁ cance. It puts in a succinct for-
mulation a dimension of biblical  teaching that has 
been the distinctive strength of the Calvinist tradi-
tion of Christian thought, both in theology and in 
a wide range of other academic disciplines.
Bavinck’s thought in general and his emphasis 
on creation in particular (understood broadly in 
terms of creation ordinances for all of life and real-
ity) are also of great signiﬁ cance for understand-
ing the so-called Amsterdam school of philosophy, 
which builds directly on Bavinck’s insights in this 
regard. D. H. T. Vollenhoven, one of the two found-
ers of this philosophical school, became a student 
of Bavinck’s at the Free University in 1911, the year 
when Bavinck published his last theological book. 
For the remaining decade of his life, Bavinck 
turned almost exclusively to the application of 
Calvinist principles to other disciplines. During 
seven of these years, Vollenhoven was Bavinck’s 
student and disciple, ﬁ rst in theology, then in phi-
losophy. In 1918 Vollenhoven received his doc-
torate with a dissertation on the philosophy of 
mathematics from a theistic point of view; he then 
began his life’s work of elaborating a Calvinistic 
philosophy. After some years, he was joined in this 
work by his wife’s brother, Herman Dooyeweerd, 
a brilliant young legal theorist of Calvinist persua-
sion who had discovered the importance of philo-
sophical questions for the theoretical foundations 
of law. During the decade of the 1920s, the two 
elaborated together the basic outline of their com-
mon philosophy, widely known as the “philosophy 
of the cosmonomic idea,” a name directly linked to 
the Calvinist emphasis on creation ordinances.
Central to the religious vision underlying the 
cosmonomic philosophy is Bavinck’s insight that 
grace restores nature, i.e., that creation is not abol-
ished but integrally renewed by salvation in Christ. 
In Vollenhoven, this insight comes out in many 
typically Bavinckian formulations in his writings 
and in his treatment of the good-evil distinction 
as a primary dimension irreducible to any cre-
ational distinctions. In Dooyeweerd the impact 
of Bavinck’s fundamental thesis can be discerned 
in his formulation of the Christian “ground-mo-
tive” (Creation, Fall, Redemption) and in his analy-
sis of the nature-grace ground-motive in Roman 
Catholicism and elsewhere.
This is not to say that Vollenhoven and 
Dooyeweerd have not substantially altered the 
formulation of Bavinck’s insight. Bavinck’s con-
ceptual apparatus is borrowed very largely 
from Neothomism, whereas Vollenhoven and 
Dooyeweerd have evolved a categorial framework 
and terminology of their own, which do fuller jus-
tice to the religious intuition of Calvinism. This 
framework and terminology are particularly evident 
in their use of the categories “law,” “subject,” and 
“direction,” which replace Bavinck’s Neothomist 
categories “substance” and “accidents,” to ex-
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press the effects of sin in creation. Where Bavinck 
speaks of sin as “accidental” to the “substance” of 
creation, Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd speak of a 
change in religious “direction” within the subject-
side of creation, leaving the law-side (or “struc-
ture”) unaffected by sin.
Bavinck’s central intuition that grace restores 
nature is therefore pivotal for an understanding of 
both the distinctive genius of Calvinism and the 
vigorous philosophical movement to which it has 
given birth. It is, moreover, of great relevance to 
the renewed discussion of the doctrine of creation 
in contemporary theology. Veenhof’s summary of 
his position is, therefore, an invaluable resource.
A few words should be said about the transla-
tion (revised 1980). Veenhof’s Dutch text has been 
closely followed, with only editorial alterations. 
These include the italicization of foreign words, 
the attempt to bring out Biblical allusions by us-
ing the language of the King James Version (just 
as Bavinck’s usage reﬂ ects the language of the 
Statenvertaling), the insertion of headings and block 
quotations to break up the text, and the expansion 
of Veenhof’s bibliographical abbreviations in the 
notes. There is an exception on the last point for 
references to Bavinck’s four- volume Gereformeerde 
Dogmatiek (Kampen, vierde druk, 1928-30), which 
are simply cited in the form “I 325,” “III 85,” etc. 
Furthermore, page references to English transla-
tions of Bavinck’s works have been added where 
applicable, although quoted passages were, in each 
case, freshly translated. Cross-references and allu-
sions to other parts of Veenhof’s text have been 
left unchanged.
The following renderings of individual words 
deserve note. Wetenschap is usually translated 
“scholarship,” sometimes “science.” Maatschappij is 
translated “society,” although this term is poten-
tially misleading, since it strictly refers to “civil so-
ciety” (bürgerliche Gesellschaft), thus excluding family, 
state, and church. However, the context generally 
prevents misunderstanding. It is difﬁ cult to render 
in English the distinction Bavinck makes between 
restauratie and herstel (p. 19 ff.), since both of these 
would normally be translated “restoration” in other 
contexts. I have chosen to reserve “restoration” for 
herstel (because of its greater frequency and to con-
form with English theological usage), and to use 
“repristination” for restauratie. The reader should 
keep in mind (though my rendering now obscures 
the fact) that the latter word carried strong over-
tones of the historically reactionary movements of 
the nineteenth century and that Bavinck is con-
sciously exploiting this pejorative connotation. 
It remains for me to thank professor Veenhof 
for his kindness in allowing this use of his disserta-
tion material. This I do gladly and with full sincer-
ity. For scores of English-speaking students, this 
short paper has already been a clear window to the 
distinctive strengths of Dutch Neocalvinism. For 
others it has become a door. For my own part, the 
translation has been a labor of love.
Addendum (2006). The above was written in 
1980 and served as preface to the last revision of 
this translation, which was originally done in 1977. 
It was for many years available (in mimeographed 
form) from the Institute for Christian Studies in 
Toronto, and I am delighted that it is now, after 
26 years, appearing in print in Pro Rege. In the in-
tervening years English translations of four of 
Bavinck’s publications have appeared in English, 
and I have taken the opportunity of incorporat-
ing references to them in this printed version of 
Veenhof’s essay. The translations in question are 
the following: (1) De zekerheid des geloofs, translated 
by Harry der Nederlanden as The Certainty of Faith
(St. Catharines, ON: Paideia Press, 1980); (2) De 
algemeene genade (1888), translated by Raymond 
C. Van Leeuwen as “Common Grace,” Calvin 
Theological Journal 24 (1989) 35-65; (3) De katholicit-
eit van christendom en kerk (1888), translated by John 
Bolt as “The Catholicity of Christianity and the 
Church,” Calvin Theological Journal 27 (1992) 220-
51; (4) the ﬁ rst three volumes of Bavinck’s magnum 
opus, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (second edition, 1906-
1911), translated by John Vriend under the edi-
torship of John Bolt as Reformed Dogmatics (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003-2006). Where these 
works are quoted in the following, I have not re-
vised my translation to conform to them, but in 
the footnotes I have now added, in brackets, the 
appropriate page numbers of these new English 
translations. Thus in “De algemeene genade, p. 21 [ET 
48],” the bracketed number gives the page number 
in Van Leeuwen’s English translation (ET) that 
corresponds to p. 21 in the Dutch. References to 
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the Gereformeerde Dogmatiek are given in the form “I 
330 [ET 1.360].” Unfortunately, volume 4 of the 
Reformed Dogmatics has not yet appeared in English, 
although its concluding section on eschatology was 
published separately as The Last Things: Hope for this 
World and the Next (1996). Since this section is to 
be incorporated (with different pagination) in the 
forthcoming fourth volume, I have refrained alto-




Bavinck’s view of the relation of nature and 
grace is a central part—indeed, perhaps we may 
even say the central theme—of his theology.1 We 
have already come across this theme a number of 
times in the above. We propose now to pay special 
attention to it, at least insofar as this theme is nec-
essary to illumine the structure of Bavinck’s doc-
trine of revelation.
Because the essence of the Christian religion 
consists in the re-creation of the cosmos into a 
kingdom of God, Bavinck writes that “the great 
question, which returns always and everywhere,” 
is this:
how is grace related to nature . . . what is the con-
nection between creation and re-creation, of the 
rich of the earth and the kingdom of heaven, of 
humanity and Christianity, of that which is below 
and that which is above? 2  
It is the ancient question as to what relationship 
must be established between the Gospel of Christ 
and culture in the broadest sense of the word. This 
question presents itself in all kinds of forms, but 
it is always the same problem which is at issue, a 
problem which is a matter of concern, not just to a 
single period but in every age, and which
deﬁ nitely does not exist only for theoretical think-
ing, but urges itself upon every person in the prac-
tical affairs of life.  All movements and schools 
which lay claim to the lives and minds of men can 
be described and judged according to the position 
which they take on this question of principle.3
The fact is that Bavinck reduces all divergences 
among Christians to differences concerning this 
fundamental problem: 
Every Christian must take into account two fac-
tors: creation and re-creation, nature and grace, 
earthly and heavenly vocation, etc.; and in accor-
dance with the different relationship in which he 
puts these to each other, his religious life assumes 
a different character. Man’s relationship to God is 
determinative of his relationship to things in gen-
eral. Whoever breaks the divinely appointed con-
nection between nature and grace is led to sacriﬁ ce 
one to the other. Socinianism and Anabaptism, 
Rationalism and Mysticism are the resulting devi-
ant paths into which the Christian goes astray.4
This fundamental problem engaged Bavinck’s 
interest from the very beginning. His ﬁ rst some-
what extended statement on the problematics in-
volved is to be found in his essay on the theology 
of Ritschl. The passage concerned is especially 
signiﬁ cant because it sheds a revealing light on 
Bavinck’s own questions and uncertainties. For the 
sake of clarity, we quote it in full:
Therefore, whereas salvation in Christ was for-
merly considered primarily a means to separate 
man from sin and the world, to prepare him for 
heavenly blessedness and to cause him to enjoy 
undisturbed fellowship with God there, Ritschl 
posits the very opposite relationship: the purpose 
of salvation in Christ is precisely to enable a per-
son, once he is freed from the oppressive feeling 
of sin and lives in the awareness of being a child of 
God, to exercise his earthly vocation and fulﬁ ll his 
moral purpose in this world. The antithesis, there-
fore, is fairly sharp: on the one side a Christian life 
which considers the highest goal, now and here-
Bavinck’s view of the 
relation of nature and grace 
is a central part—indeed, 
perhaps we may even say 
the central theme—of his 
theology.1
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after, to be the contemplation of God and fellow-
ship with Him, and for that reason (always being 
more or less hostile to the riches of an earthly life) 
is in danger of falling into monasticism and as-
ceticism, pietism and mysticism; but on the side of 
Ritschl, a Christian life which considers its high-
est goal to be the Kingdom of God, i.e. the moral 
obligation of mankind, and for that reason (always 
being more or less averse to the withdrawal into 
solitude and quiet communion with God), is in 
danger of degenerating into a cold Pelagianism 
and an unfeeling moralism. Personally, I do not yet see 
any way of combining the two points of view, but I do know 
that there is much that is excellent in both, and that both 
contain undeniable truth.5
Since Bavinck himself gives expression to his 
uncertainty, it is all the more of interest to exam-
ine Bavinck’s later discussions of this theme. It was 
still in the same year in which the essay on Ritschl 
was published, 1888, that Bavinck delivered his 
rectorial oration on the catholicity of Christianity 
and the church, in which he dealt extensively with 
the nature-grace relation. This was supplemented 
and further elaborated in the 1894 rectorial oration 
on common grace. These two publications from 
Bavinck’s ﬁ rst period provide us with his most ex-
tensive treatment of the subject under discussion 
and also undoubtedly constitute the best source for 
getting to know Bavinck’s thoughts on the matter. 
All the subsequent discussions in Bavinck’s writ-
ings about the relation of nature and grace (and 
they are considerable) can be considered a further 
explication and undergirding of his argument in 
these two orations. Accordingly, it is in the ﬁ rst 
place from these two speeches that we have chieﬂ y 
drawn our materials for this section; in the notes 
(and later on also in the text) we have identiﬁ ed and 
quoted passages from other publications as well.
Confrontation with Roman Catholicism
As always, Bavinck develops his own viewpoint 
in constant critical confrontation with all kinds of 
schools of thought, past and present, in this case 
primarily with Roman Catholicism.6 It is really 
impossible to disengage Bavinck’s own views on 
nature and grace from his digniﬁ ed but incisive 
polemics. We will do well, therefore, not to leave 
aside this critique but to include it in our analysis.
Bavinck reminds us that the concept “world” is 
used in two senses in the New Testament. Firstly, 
it denotes the world insofar as the world is fallen 
under the dominion of sin, but secondly, it also 
denotes that same world insofar as the world has 
been the object of God’s love. In this connection 
he refers, among other texts, to John 3:16 and l7 
— passages which play an important role in his 
discussions of nature and grace.7 After the New 
Testament period, however, people soon began 
to deviate from this view of the world: “The two 
lines which are indicated by Scripture for our view 
of the world are not maintained and worked out 
equally.”8 In general, the early Christians had a 
strictly negative attitude toward the world and its 
culture: “The second and third centuries are full 
of dualism and asceticism.” The church itself, wit-
ness her rejection of Montanism and Donatism, 
etc., did not want to take the road of asceticism and 
separatism. She wanted to be a world church and 
was successful in this, but not without having rec-
ognized and assimilated asceticism and monasti-
cism as a legitimate element within her boundaries, 
although she continued to uphold the legitimacy of 
the lower ideal as well:9 “In this way the qualitative 
opposition which had originally existed between 
the world and the church was transformed into a 
quantitative one.”10
It is at this point that the principle of the Roman 
Catholic world-view comes to the fore:
In Roman Catholicism ‘the world’ more and more 
loses the ethical signiﬁ cance which it has in the 
Scriptures. That which is natural is not sinful, but 
it is that which constitutionally does not attain 
the supernatural. The supernatural is a donum su-
peradditum… Consequently Christianity and grace, 
which have entered the world to enable us to attain 
the supernatural, the visio Dei, do not reform and 
recreate the existing order, but only complement 
creation. Christianity transcendently supervenes 
upon the natural, but does not penetrate and sanc-
tify it. Thereby Roman Catholicism, which calls it-
self catholic in a pre-eminent sense, has altered the 
nature of the catholicity of the New Testament. 
The catholicity of the Christian principle, which 
puriﬁ es and sanctiﬁ es everything, has been re-
placed by the dualism which puts the supernatu-
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ral in a separate position alongside, or rather in a 
transcendent position above the natural. Creation 
and re-creation remain two independent quanti-
ties over against each other.11
Catholicism, therefore, holds to a “juxtaposi-
tion of the natural and the supernatural order.”12 
As a result, “The supernatural is an order of its 
own, aloof from the natural life, and sealed off 
from it on all sides.”13 In all this “the genius of the 
Roman Catholic system” is the principle of hier-
archy. This principle explains the relatively favor-
able evaluation of the natural, which in Catholic 
thought is good in itself; it is only incomplete and 
needs complementation.14 The root of the whole 
system, in Bavinck’s judgement, is to be found in 
Pelagianism:
If for a moment you abstract from the supernatu-
ral order which Catholicism has built up around 
the natural order, then you will have nothing left 
but pure rationalism, genuine Pelagianism, and 
unadulterated deism.15
The essence of the Catholic world-view is, 
therefore, that the natural is good in itself but be-
longs to a lower order:
Catholicism therefore does indeed hold to the 
catholicity of Christianity insofar as Catholicism 
lays claim to the whole world and seeks to subor-
dinate all things to the church. But this catholicity 
is denied in the sense that Christianity itself must 
permeate everything like a leaven. It remains an 
eternal dualism, Christianity does not become an 
immanent and reforming principle. This dualism 
is not an antinomy, in which one pole excludes the 
other. Catholicism does not annihilate the natural, 
in the manner of the Manichaeans, but devalues 
it. To be sure, it allows marriage, family, earthly 
vocation, the state, science and art to exist, and 
even gives to all of these, within the limits of their 
proper spheres, a much greater freedom to move 
than Protestantism does; but it depreciates and 
depresses the natural; it puts on everything the 
stamp of contempt and brands it as the profane. 
In Catholicism the fundamental opposition is not 
that of holy and unholy, but of consecrated and 
profane. It reduces the ethical to the material, and 
looks upon the natural as something non-divine 
not because and insofar as it is impure, but be-
cause it is incapable of attaining the supernatural. 
Catholicism makes the cosmos profane.16
Hence, anything that passes from the domain 
of nature to that of the supernatural order must be 
consecrated.17
With “this imposing Roman Catholic system 
the Reformation came into collision at virtually 
every point.” The sixteenth-century Reformation 
was not only a reformation of the church but 
also an “entirely different and new conception of 
Christianity itself”: The Reformers, going back to 
the New Testament, replaced the dualistic world 
and life view of Catholicism, and its quantitative 
opposition between the natural and the supernatu-
ral, “with a truly theistic world-view and a quali-
tative opposition.”18 The Reformation, “as begun 
by Luther and Zwingli, and reinforced and carried 
through by Calvin, put an end to the Romish super-
naturalism and dualism and asceticism.”19 Because 
of the way in which the Reformation established 
the relation of nature and grace, the cosmos of 
course immediately gains signiﬁ cantly in impor-
tance. It “continues to be the primary, the original, 
the natural state, to which the Christian religion, 
the foedus gratiae, is intended to lead back”:20
The Reformation gave us a clearer understand-
ing not only of the articles of faith concerning 
the Father and the Holy Spirit, concerning the 
church and forgiveness; it also rehabilitated the 
ﬁ rst article of our ecumenical Christian faith, and 
gave full weight to the confession: “I believe in 
God, the Father, Almighty, Creator of heaven 
Because of the way in which 
the Reformation established 
the relation of nature 
and grace, the cosmos of 
course immediately gains 
significantly in importance.
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and earth.” In this they rediscovered the natural, 
restored it to its rightful place, and freed it from 
the Roman Catholic stigma of being profane and 
unconsecrated. The natural is not something of 
lesser value and of a lower order, as though it were 
not susceptible to sanctiﬁ cation and renewal, but 
rather required only to be bridled and repressed. It 
is just as divine as the church, though it owes its 
origin not to re-creation but creation, though it is 
not from the Son but from the Father.21
In this way, the mechanical relation of nature and 
grace is replaced in Protestantism by an ethical 
one:
Christianity is not a quantitative entity which hov-
ers transcendently above the natural, but a reli-
gious and ethical power which enters immanently 
within the natural and banishes only that which is 
impure. The Kingdom of heaven may be a trea-
sure and a pearl; it is also a mustard seed and a 
leaven.22
This principial divergence between Roman 
Catholicism and the Reformation comes into sharp 
focus in the contrast with respect to the concept of 
grace. In Catholicism, writes Bavinck, grace has a 
double task: ut elevet et sanet. But the ﬁ rst completely 
overshadows the second. Grace is necessary abso-
lutely in the ﬁ rst sense, but only per accidens in the 
second:
Grace in Catholicism is in the ﬁ rst place a qual-
ity which is added to man above and beyond the 
natural order, and through which he is in princi-
ple taken up into a supernatural order, becomes 
a participant in the divine nature and the vision 
of God, and is enabled to accomplish the kind of 
supernatural works which ex condigno earn eternal 
life.23
The Reformation, however, rejected the Neopla-
tonic mysticism underlying this conception, of 
which the most important thing is the elevation of 
man above his nature, his deiﬁ cation; it
returned to the simplicity of Holy Scripture, and 
therefore acquired an entirely different concep-
tion of grace. Grace does not serve to take man 
up into a supernatural order, but to liberate him 
from sin. Grace is not opposed to nature, but only 
to sin. Properly speaking, it was not necessary for 
Adam before the Fall, but has become necessary 
only because of sin; therefore it is not necessary 
absolutely, but only per accidens. The physical op-
position of natural and supernatural is replaced by 
the ethical one of sin and grace.
The function of grace is exclusively the removal 
of sin; if this happens, then man is automatically 
image of God again, for the image of God is not 
a donum superadditum but belongs to the essence of 
man. “There is thus no need for there to be, next 
to the grace which delivers from sin, another grace 
which moreover elevates man above his nature.”24
A corollary of this is that grace in Reformation 
theology in no way can have the character of a sub-
stance. For that matter, the mere fact that sin is 
not a substance, and has not deprived man of any-
thing substantial, means that grace can never be 
conceived of as a substance: 
It is a restoration of the forma that was impressed 
upon man and creatures in general at creation. 
Re-creation is not a second, new creation. It does 
not add any new creatures to the existing order, 
or introduce a new substance, but it is essentially 
reformation. In this the operation of grace extends 
intensively as far as the power of sin. Sin has af-
fected everything; it has “corrupted the whole or-
ganism of creation, the very nature of creatures; 
and therefore grace is a power of God which liber-
ates mankind from sin also inwardly in the core of 
its being, and shall one day present it without spot 
or wrinkle before God’s face.25  
Confrontation with
Other Protestant Traditions
The change which was effected by the 
Reformation in the Roman Catholic world-view 
was indeed nothing less than a complete revolu-
tion. In Bavinck’s view, however, there did not 
exist a complete harmony among the Reformers. 
While Luther and Zwingli, each in his own way, 
were still caught in dualism to a certain extent, 
it remained for Calvin to overcome this dual-
ism. Bavinck is not without criticism vis-à-vis the 
Genevan Reformer, but this criticism does not pre-
vent him from giving expression to his profound 
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admiration for Calvin. It was Calvin, according to 
Bavinck, whose reforming labors
completed the Reformation and saved 
Protestantism. Calvin traced the operation of sin 
to a wider extent than Luther, to a greater depth 
than Zwingli. But it is for that reason that the 
grace of God is more restricted in Luther, less 
rich in Zwingli, than it is in Calvin. In the power-
ful mind of the French Reformer, re-creation is 
not a system which supplements creation, as in 
Catholicism, not a religious reformation which 
leaves creation intact, as in Luther, much less a 
new creation, as in Anabaptism, but a joyful tiding 
of the renewal of all creatures. Here the Gospel 
comes fully into its own, comes to true catholicity. 
There is nothing that cannot and ought not to be 
evangelized. Not only the church, but also home, 
school, society and state are placed under the do-
minion of the principle of Christianity.26
With complete conviction, Bavinck chooses 
Calvin’s position and makes it his criterion for judg-
ing all kinds of movements and schools that have 
arisen in the history of the church and theology. 
Thus, he detects the inﬂ uence of Roman Catholic 
dualism in the Socinians and Anabaptists: “The 
former disregarded the gratia specialis and were left 
with nothing but nature; the latter despised the 
gratia communis and knew of nothing but grace.”27
These two movements exerted a powerful inﬂ u-
ence also within the churches of the Reformation. 
The inﬂ uence of Anabaptism can be shown, for 
example, in Pietism, the Moravian Church and 
Methodism.”28 Bavinck does not want to detract in 
the least from the great achievements of the lead-
ers and pioneers of these movements. Nevertheless 
he ﬁ nds something missing in their Christianity: 
“The genuine, true catholicity of Christianity is 
missing.” In all these movements
there prevails a restrictive, ascetic view of the 
world and all its culture. Whether they withdraw 
themselves into isolation in the Pietist manner, 
or attack the world in Methodist fashion and at-
tempt to conquer it by main force, never do we 
ﬁ nd here genuine, true, full reformation; there is 
only a rescuing and snatching of individuals out 
of the world which lies in wickedness; never a 
methodical, organic reformation of the whole, of 
the cosmos, of the nation and country. In all these 
movements there is an attack on the component 
parts, not on the centre; on the ramparts, not on 
the fortress itself.
Bavinck characterizes their struggles as “guerilla 
warfare, weakening the enemy here and there, but 
not gaining the victory.” The world and culture 
were left to their own devices.29
The “glorious truth” of Pietism and related re-
ligious movements is that the kingdom of heaven 
must count as the highest priority. However, the 
mystical aspect of Christianity must be kept in bal-
ance with the ethical, genuinely human aspect:
Faith appears to be great, indeed, when a person 
renounces all and shuts himself up in isolation. 
But even greater, it seems to me, is the faith of the 
person who, while keeping the kingdom of heaven 
as a treasure, at the same time brings it out into the 
world as a leaven.30
Liberal theology wanted to restrict Christ’s power 
and word to the heart and the inner chamber, ap-
pealing to the fact that his kingdom was not of this 
world. However, “though it is not of this world, it is 
in this world and meant for it.”31 The non-Christian 
world wants the Christians to withdraw themselves 
into isolation and to give the world peace and free-
dom of movement;
But the catholicity of both Christianity and the 
church prevents us from complying with this de-
sire... To be sure, the kingdom of God is not of 
this world, but it does require that everything be 
subservient to it. It is exclusive, and does not coun-
While Luther and Zwingli, 
each in his own way, were 
still caught in dualism to a 
certain extent, it remained 
for Calvin to overcome this 
dualism.
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tenance any independent or neutral realm of the 
world alongside it.32 
Bavinck is evidently fearful of the danger that a 
one-sided pietistic attitude would unintentionally 
abet the secularization of human life advocated 
by modernism and positivism. For that reason, 
he does not hesitate to point out the dark side, or 
rather the fundamental mistake, of this pietism, 
namely the avoidance of the battle in the social and 
political arena, and in scholarship.33 In this Bavinck 
is opposing, among other things, the introverted 
attitude, the inclination toward otherworldliness 
and suspicion of culture, which he observed in the 
circles of his own Afgescheiden Reformed church.34
He states emphatically that contempt for created 
life is wrong: “it is in conﬂ ict with both Scripture 
and experience.” We must adopt the biblical posi-
tion, which ﬂ atly contradicts this negative evalua-
tion; “Every kind of separatism and asceticism is 
thereby cut off at the root. All otherworldliness 
and world-ﬂ ight is a denial of the ﬁ rst article of 
the Apostle’s creed.”35 When Bavinck discusses the 
biblical appreciation of created life, he very often 
refers to 1 Timothy 4:4-5 and 1 John 3:8 (“the Son 
of God was manifested, not that He might destroy 
the works of the Father, but that he might destroy 
the works of the devil, in order thus to restore the 
works of the Father”). The whole world, then, has 
been given over to corruption through sin, but 
through grace it is also being saved in its entire-
ty from sin: “Sin came into the world; that is also 
why God loved the world.” The word of liberation 
which comes to us in Christ is therefore not law 
but gospel: “It is grace alone. And this grace does 
not abolish nature, but afﬁ rms and restores it.”36
This last phrase expresses the heart of 
Bavinck’s view of the relation of nature and grace. 
All Bavinck’s reﬂ ections about this relation can be 
brought back to this point of departure. This ex-
plains the fact that Bavinck brings it up repeatedly 
in all kinds of formulations. It is the central theme 
that recurs in numberless variations, the refrain 
that is unceasingly repeated, the leitmotif which we 
hear everywhere. By way of illustration, we ad-
duce the following quotations (a selection from the 
many that could be given), which bring this central 
theme to expression. Bavinck writes,
So Christianity did not come into the world to 
condemn and put under the ban everything which 
existed beforehand and elsewhere, but quite the 
opposite, to purify from sin everything that was; 
and thus to cause it to answer again to its own na-
ture and purpose.37
Because revelation is soteriological in content,
It does not mean an annihilation, but a restora-
tion of God’s sin-disrupted work of creation. 
Revelation is an act of reformation; in re-creation 
the creation, with all its forms and norms, is re-
stored; in the gospel, the law; in grace, justice; in 
Christ, the cosmos is restored.38
Salvation in Christ is “not a second, new creation, 
but a re-creation.” Bavinck continues with these 
striking words:
It would have been much simpler if God had de-
stroyed the whole fallen world and replaced it with 
an entirely new one. But it was His good pleasure 
to re-establish the fallen world, and to liberate 
from sin the same mankind which had sinned.39
In Roman Catholicism, Christianity may still 
be Erlösungsreligion, but “it is in the ﬁ rst place not 
reparatio, but elevatio naturae.”40 However, accord-
ing to Bavinck’s reformational conviction, salva-
tion is precisely reparatio of created, natural life. 
That is why he can maintain the position, over 
against Roman Catholicism as well as Pietism and 
Methodism, that nature as God’s creation “is in 
itself of no less value than grace.” The Holy Spirit, 
who acts in continuity with God’s directives in nat-
ural life, “seeks by His grace to restore the whole 
of natural life, to liberate it from sin and to hal-
low it to God.”41 “The kingdom of God is hostile 
to nothing but sin alone.”42 This insight makes it 
possible for Bavinck to replace the predominantly 
ontological and metaphysical Roman Catholic con-
ception with a much more religious and existential 
approach to the problematics. Consider only the 
following remarkable statement:
Grace and sin are opposites; the latter is overcome 
only by the power of the former; but as soon as the 
power of sin is broken (and in the same measure 
that it is) the opposition between God and man 
disappears.43
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Grace militates against sin in the natural, but it 
does not militate against the natural itself; on the 
contrary, it restores the natural and brings it to its 
normal development, i.e. the development intend-
ed by God.44 
It is therefore a mistake to suppose that grace is 
restrictive of the capacities and abilities inherent in 
human nature or renders them inoperative. In an 
important discussion about revelation and reason, 
Bavinck argues that there can be no deactivation 
of reason by revelation: “Grace does not repress 
nature, including the reason and understanding 
of man, but rather raises it up and renews it, and 
stimulates it to concentrated effort.”45
Special Aspects of Bavinck’s View
a) Trinitarian
A number of aspects of Bavinck’s conception 
merit separate attention. In the ﬁ rst place, it should 
be mentioned that Bavinck puts his basic theme in 
a Trinitarian context. The confession of the Father 
as Creator “afﬁ rms the value of the natural in its 
own right; the divine origin of all that exists; the 
original goodness of the world, and within that 
world of family and society, of scholarship and art, 
of commerce and industry. There is nothing sin-
ful in itself.” “Because sin does not belong to the 
substance of creation, but is a deformation of that 
which exists, God can still love the world in spite 
of the corruption brought about by sin; it still re-
mained His creation, and to that degree good. And 
He has loved the world “with eternal and almighty 
love.”46 The love of the Father is evident from the 
giving of His Son, and the love of the Son is evi-
dent from His acceptance of the death of the cross 
for the sake of the restoration of God’s creation:
The grace of the Son therefore extends as far as 
the love of the Father. It is just as deep in content, 
just as wide in extent, just as powerful in effect. 
Nor are any greater limitations put on the regen-
erating and renewing activity of the Holy Spirit...
He grants His indwelling and fellowship to every-
thing which the Father has loved, and which the 
Son has bought with His blood.47
  No other limit is put to the love of the Father, 
the grace of the Son and the fellowship of the Holy 
Spirit than that which is established in the ever 
wise and holy counsel of God. No domain of life 
is excluded from re-creation. Nothing is in itself 
beyond redemption or reconciliation. There need 
be no despair about any of God’s creatures.48
Within the Trinitarian context an important 
place goes to the Christological dimension of the 
theme. Bavinck’s Christocentric conception of spe-
cial revelation, in combination with his conviction 
concerning the universal soteriological purpose of 
this revelation, manifests its full signiﬁ cance at this 
point. The universal range and scope of Christ’s 
deliverance is based on the “soteriological concen-
tration” of Christ’s person and work. Jesus, says 
Bavinck, was not a new legislator, no statesman, no 
philosopher, etc., but only Jesus, i.e., Savior:
But that He was completely and entirely, not 
in the narrow sense of Roman Catholics, and 
Anabaptists and Lutherans, but in the full, deep, 
broad Reformed sense. Christ did not come only 
to restore the ethical-religious life of man, and to 
leave all the rest untouched as though this had not 
been corrupted by sin and did not stand in need of 
restoration. No, the love of God, the grace of the 
Son and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit extend 
as far as sin.49
To be sure, the soteriological concentration of 
Christ’s work may never be lost sight of. Nothing 
can be compared with the Kingdom of God, which 
Grace militates against 
sin in the natural, but it 
does not militate against 
the natural itself; on the 
contrary, it restores the 
natural and brings it to its 
normal development, i.e. 
the development intended 
by God.44 
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He establishes; he who wishes to enter it must deny 
everything: “the cross is the condemnation of the 
world and the sentence of death upon all sinful 
culture.” But it is a mistake, Bavinck continues, to 
deduce from this proclamation “that the gospel is 
hostile to culture.” The gospel of the kingdom may 
not be isolated from the organic context in which it 
occurs in history and Scripture. For Christ does not 
stand at the beginning but makes His appearance 
in the center of history. He presupposes the work 
of the Father in creation and providence, including 
speciﬁ cally His guidance of Israel. In fact, Christ is 
the same One Who, as the Word, made all things 
and, in particular, was the life and light of all men. 
If, therefore, Christ was exclusively proclaimer and 
founder of the Kingdom, Bavinck observes,
then He cannot have come to destroy the work of 
the Father, to destroy His own work in creation 
and providence, but on the contrary, to save it 
from the destruction which man by his sin has in-
ﬂ icted upon it.50
In the second place, the proclamation of Jesus 
may therefore not be isolated either from that 
which followed it after the cruciﬁ xion. The humili-
ated One is the exalted One:
In His exaltation He takes back what He had 
denied in His humiliation, but now freed from 
guilt, cleansed from every spot, regenerated and 
renewed by the spirit. The resurrection is the res-
toration in principle of all culture.
For Christ accepted the body in which He had 
borne the sin of the world on the cross.51 In the 
resurrection Bavinck sees his foundational convic-
tion conﬁ rmed. He puts it in the following pithy 
formulation:
The bodily resurrection of Christ from the dead is 
conclusive proof that Christianity does not adopt a 
hostile attitude towards anything human or natu-
ral, but intends only to deliver creation from all 
that is sinful, and to sanctify it completely.52
It is worthy of note that Bavinck, in this re-
spect, also attaches great weight to the incarnation 
as such, i.e., irrespective of cross and resurrection. 
It is instructive what he says about the connection 
between the denial of Christ’s human nature and 
the contrasting of nature and grace. The denial of 
the genuine and complete human nature always 
proceeds, in his view, from a certain dualism, and 
therefore undermines the confession concerning 
the Creator and the catholicity of the Christian 
religion.53 On the other hand, the unqualiﬁ ed af-
ﬁ rmation of Christ’s humanity implies, at least in 
principle, a correct conception of the relation of 
nature and grace because it makes impossible the 
devaluation of the earthly and human. The incar-
nation teaches that the divine can reveal itself in 
a completely human manner.54 This contains the 
further implication, of no small importance, that 
while the human does constitute the organ of sin, 
the human is not sin itself.
Scripture, writes Bavinck, “maintains, also in 
the incarnation, the goodness of creation and the 
divine origin of matter.”55 The incarnation in prin-
ciple implies “the overcoming of all dualism, the 
condemnation of ascetism....”56 Kuitert is right to 
speak of Bavinck’s “anti-spiritualism.”57
b) Sin/Grace not Substantial
Another important component of Bavinck’s 
conception is his heavy emphasis on the fact that 
grace can restore nature, since sin, no matter how 
much it may have permeated every sector of cre-
ated life, is nevertheless “accidental” in the philo-
sophical sense of not belonging to the essence or 
substance of things. Sin is
not a substance, but a quality; not materia, but forma; 
it is not the essence of things, but rather adheres to 
the essence; it is a privatio, though a privatio actuosa, 
and to that extent contingent, an alien intruder 
like death. It can therefore be isolated from the 
essence and removed from it. The world is and re-
mains susceptible to puriﬁ cation and deliverance. 
Its essence can be saved, and its original state can 
return.58
It is a distinguishing mark of the Christian religion 
that it maintains the purely ethical nature of sin, and 
it is enabled to do this by the distinction it makes 
between creation and Fall. In all systems which 
identify sin with the substance of things, creation 
is denatured to a Fall.59 In Bavinck’s judgement, 
none of the non-Christian religions have succeed-
ed in avoiding this identiﬁ cation of creation and 
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Fall and thus the substantial conception of sin. For 
him only one religion gives the true perspective on 
this point, and that is Christianity:60
It is Christianity alone, among all religions, which 
has conceived of sin as being purely religious and 
ethical, as being sin, has detached it from sub-
stance of every kind, and has distinguished it from 
all physical evil.61
Now it is owing to this ethical conception of sin 
that the view can be maintained that grace restores 
nature. For in this view sin, because it is not a sub-
stance, could not alter the essence, the substance 
of creation either. Man as sinner still remains man, 
and similarly all other creatures, in spite of sin and 
the reign of corruption, have remained the same 
in substance and essence. And because sin has not 
taken away substance, grace does not, as we have 
seen, give back substance. 
The materia of all things is and remains the same, 
but the forma, given in creation, was deformed 
by sin, to be once again completely reformed by 
grace.62
The non-substantial character of grace is intimately 
allied to the non-substantial character of sin. 
c) Reformation, not revolution
The next motif to which we draw attention is 
closely connected with the foregoing. We refer to 
the fact, frequently and forcefully underscored by 
Bavinck, that the reformation which Christ brought about 
by His revelation differs fundamentally from revolution. 
Moses and the prophets, Christ and the apostles 
“discriminated in an inimitable manner between 
healthy and sick reality.” Whereas in other religions 
and philosophical systems “these two spheres” are 
constantly confused and mixed together, the spe-
cial revelation that comes to us in Christ
keeps the two in clear distinction; it acknowledges 
nature, everywhere and without reservation, but it 
nevertheless joins battle with sin on every front. It 
seeks the reformation of natural life, always and 
everywhere, but only for the purpose and by the 
means of liberating it from unrighteousnss.63
This insight is also determinative for the assess-
ment of concrete events and movements in social 
and political affairs: 
Because the gospel is concerned exclusively with 
liberation from sin, it leaves all natural institutions 
intact. It is in principle opposed to all socialism, 
communism and anarchism, since these never 
oppose only sin, but identify (through the denial 
of the Fall) sin with nature, unrighteousness with 
the very institution of family and state and society, 
and thus creation with the Fall. For the same rea-
son the gospel is averse to revolution of any kind 
which arises out of the principle of unbelief, since 
such revolution, in its overthrow of the existing 
order, makes no distinction between nature and 
sin, and eradicates the good together with the bad. 
The gospel, by contrast, always proceeds reforma-
tionally. The gospel itself brings about the great-
est reformation, because it brings liberation from 
guilt, renews the heart, and thus in principle re-
stores the right relation of man to God.64
What Bavinck calls “the greatest reformation” 
is the pivot, the dominating centre. But out of this 
centre the gospel “makes a reforming and renew-
ing impact on all earthly institutions.” The gospel, 
after all, is a “gospel,” “glad tidings for all crea-
tures; not an announcement of destruction and 
death, but of resurrection and life.” The gospel at-
tacks sin alone, but it attacks sin always and every-
where. Now,“by liberating all social conditions and 
institutions from sin, it also seeks to restore them 
all according to God’s will, and to make them an-
swer to their own nature.”  As a result, the gospel 
avoids, on the one hand, the danger of conserva-
In Bavinck’s judgement, 
none of the non-Christian 
religions have succeeded in 
avoiding this identification 
of creation and Fall 
and thus the substantial 
conception of sin.
22     Pro Rege—June 2006
tism, which refuses to give attention to change in 
society, and, on the other hand, revolutionary radi-
calism, which lacks any constant standpoint in the 
ﬂ ux of events.65 Though averse to every kind of 
revolution, the Gospel is “all the more concerned 
for reformation.” In its struggle—not against na-
ture as such, but against sin and falsehood—“it 
proclaims principles which, not through revolu-
tionary, but through moral and spiritual means, 
have their effect everywhere, which reform and re-
new everything.” It is “a leaven which leavens ev-
erything...; a principle which recreates everything; 
a power which overcomes the world.”66
d) Restoration, not repristination
A further important point of view is that the 
redemption by grace of created reality, the refor-
mation of nature, is not merely repristination, but 
raises the natural to a higher level than it originally occupied. 
In the future, Bavinck writes, the “original order” 
will be restored. Not, however,
as though nothing had happened, as though 
sin had not existed, and the revelation of God’s 
grace in Christ had never occurred. Christ gives 
more than sin took away; grace did much more 
abound.67
Bavinck is here not indirectly making a case for the 
notion of an elevation of the natural, as in Roman 
Catholic theology and elsewhere.68 We must take 
into consideration the fact that, according to the 
conception of Reformed dogmatics (a conception 
to which Bavinck subscribes), Adam did not yet 
possess the greatest height: material freedom, the 
inability any longer to err, to sin, or to die. 
The pre-Fall situation of man, and of the whole 
earth, was a temporary one, which could not re-
main as it was. It was of such a nature that it could 
be raised to a higher glory, but could also, in case 
of man’s transgression, be made subject to vanity 
and corruption.69
Although the latter occurred through sin, grace in-
tends to bring the situation of man and the world 
to this higher glory. The fact must not be neglect-
ed, however, that this higher glory constitutes the 
goal to which the earth had been directed from the 
beginning. Therefore it is certainly not added to the 
creation as a foreign component. For that reason 
Bavinck’s thesis that reformation through grace 
is more than mere repristination is no denial of his 
foundational principle that grace restores nature. 
Bavinck writes that grace
does not grant anything beyond what Adam, if he 
had remained standing, would have acquired in 
the way of obedience. The covenant of grace dif-
fers from the covenant of works in the road, not in 
its ﬁ nal destination. The same beneﬁ ts are prom-
ised in the covenant of works and freely given in 
the covenant of grace. Grace restores nature and 
raises it to its highest fulﬁ llment, but it does not 
add a new, heterogeneous component to it.70
In Bavinck’s view there is succession and pro-
gression, development and ascent in the works of 
God: 
There is a movement from creation through re-
demption to sanctiﬁ cation and gloriﬁ cation. The 
point of arrival returns to the point of departure, 
and is simultaneously a high point elevated high 
above the point of departure. The works of God 
describe a circle which strives upward like a spiral; 
they are a combination of the horizontal and the 
vertical line; they move forward and upward at the 
same time.71
It is not necessary, at this point, to explore in 
greater depth the inﬂ uence of Bavinck’s funda-
mental theme on the different loci of dogmatic 
theology.72 We only point out that the thesis con-
cerning the restoration of nature by grace, in com-
bination with the insight that reformation is more 
than repristination, is constitutive for Bavinck’s 
eschatology.73
Practical Consequences
To complete the overall picture, and to bring it 
into sharper focus, it remains for us to pay special 
attention to what Bavinck himself indicated were 
the practical consequences of his fundamental theme, 
a number of which have already been mentioned 
in passing in the foregoing discussion. In the ﬁ rst 
place, we can observe that in this conception the 
independence of the different societal spheres is 
fully honored, while at the same time the salutary 
effect of the gospel in all these spheres is emphati-
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cally underscored. Family, society, and state arise 
out of creation, according to Bavinck, and exist by 
virtue of gratia communis. Bavinck evidently agrees 
fully with Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty. It 
is also his conviction that sovereignty in these “or-
ganic life-spheres” descends directly from God to 
created reality and that each has a God-given au-
thority of its own.74 This authority does not in the 
least imply that the spheres in question have noth-
ing to do with the gospel. On the contrary, they 
have been corrupted by sin and therefore need the 
word of God as rule and guide:
But here again grace does not annul nature. 
Family, society, and state do experience regenera-
tion by the Spirit of Christ, but they exist and live 
by virtue of the order of God in nature and re-
tain their full independence alongside the church. 
Christ did not come to destroy the world and the 
various spheres of life within it, but to restore and 
save them.
The same is true of art and scholarship: 
They, like man himself, are conceived and born in 
sin; but they are not sinful and unclean in them-
selves. They can be sanctiﬁ ed by the word and the 
Spirit of Christ. Also for these mighty factors of 
civilization the gospel is a word of salvation and 
blessing.75
But here too re-creation is something other than 
creation. Art and scholarship have their principium
not in the special grace of regeneration and con-
version, but in the natural gifts and talents which 
God in His common grace grants also to unbe-
lievers.76
The gospel of Christ only serves to liberate art and 
scholarship from sin and falsehood and to make 
them answer to their true purpose.77
Bavinck thus consciously and intentionally 
rejects two approaches to the question of the na-
ture-grace relation that have often been taken in 
the practice of life. On the one hand, he rejects 
the Roman Catholic attempt to have natural life 
overarched by a sacral, supernatural superstruc-
ture. In this way, grace remains suspended above
nature. On the other hand, he resists every concep-
tion which tends to enclose the gospel within the 
province of the spiritual life, narrowly conceived, 
and thus to contrast it with life in the world and 
human culture. This can happen on the basis of 
the presuppositions of either an extreme Pietism 
or a Kantian dualism. The difference between the 
two, however important in other respects, is ir-
relevant with respect to the point at issue, insofar 
as life in the world and human culture is in both 
cases withdrawn from the effective inﬂ uence of 
the gospel. In this way, grace continues to stand 
next to nature. In opposition to this view, Bavinck 
argues that grace penetrates into nature and puriﬁ es 
it from within. For that reason the gospel cannot 
stand over against nature. 
Sin it condemns, always and everywhere, but mar-
riage and family, society and state, nature and his-
tory, art and scholarship, it holds dear. Despite the 
many failings of those who confess the gospel, it 
has been through the centuries a rich blessing for 
all these institutions and activities. The Christian 
peoples still continue to be the bearers of culture.78
To be sure, the gospel is no social or political pro-
gram, no textbook for science or art; it is the book 
of God’s redemptive revelation, and as such, it has, 
as we shall see more clearly shortly,79 a religio-ethi-
cal purpose. But precisely in its soteriological con-
centration, the gospel attains a universal range and 
scope and has a redemptive impact on the totality 
of human life. Bavinck willingly subscribes to the 
view of Calvin, who saw in Christianity
not merely a principle of new spiritual life, but 
also an element, the most important element, of 
…he resists every conception 
which tends to enclose the 
gospel within the province of 
the spiritual life, narrowly 
conceived, and thus to 
contrast it with life in the 
world and human culture.
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culture; to him the Gospel was good news for all 
creatures, including family, society, scholarship 
and art.80
From this vantage point, we can also understand 
the vocation of believers in the world. Bavinck’s 
view of this vantage point can perhaps be formu-
lated as follows: the soteriological concentration of 
Christ’s work and word, and the universal range 
and scope that is based upon it, must be reﬂ ected 
in the lives of believers in such a way that the faith-
relation with Christ constitutes not only the deci-
sive pre-condition but also the driving force for the 
unfolding of created reality in meaningful cultural 
work. The faith-relation with Christ through the 
gospel is primary. Man must ﬁ rst become son of 
God again, before he can become “a cultural crea-
ture” in the true sense of the word.81 But once he is 
son of God, he can also dedicate himself to culture 
again. With evident agreement he quotes the epi-
grammatic words of Johann Christoph Blumhardt 
to the effect “that man must be converted twice, 
ﬁ rst from the natural to the spiritual life, and 
thereafter from the spiritual to the natural life.”82 
The disciples of Christ do have a calling to bear 
their cross, to deny themselves, and to follow their 
Master, but not to practice asceticism and other-
worldliness. They must adopt a positive attitude 
toward earthly life. It is precisely this which was 
also the intention of the Reformation:
a Christianity which was hostile, not to nature, but 
only to sin.... In the Reformation the old adage 
came into its own again: natura commendat gratiam, 
gratia emendat naturam.83
Conclusion
Thus, to believers living in fellowship with 
Christ, the way is opened again to the whole arena 
of human affairs. All things are theirs, Bavinck 
writes, inasmuch as and insofar as they are Christ’s, 
and Christ is God’s. The reference is to a Pauline 
text that Bavinck often cites in this context: 1 
Corinthians 3:23.84 Especially in his ﬁ ne essay on 
the certainty or assurance of faith, Bavinck has 
made some beautiful observations about this vo-
cation of believers within the broad horizons of 
human life. On this point too he is critical of the 
negative evaluation of social and cultural affairs in 
the circles of the earlier Pietistic Christians.85 There 
can be no doubt that Bavinck is far from poking 
fun, in the well-known manner (whether with su-
percilious arrogance or sardonic irony, from the 
vantage point of a real or imagined cultural superi-
ority), at this Pietistic life style, as at an anachronis-
tic curiosity. He is, rather, of the opinion that this 
Pietism holds up the mirror to ourselves and opens 
our eyes to the dangers of an unbridled and unbro-
ken cultural optimism – dangers which Bavinck 
knew only too well were certainly not imaginary in 
the circles of his occasionally overzealous fellow-
Calvinists. It was his conviction that “this move-
ment [Pietism] gives evidence of an appreciation 
and concern for the one thing needful, which is 
only too often absent from us in the busy rush of 
contemporary life.”86 Against the Pietists, never-
theless, he maintains that the signiﬁ cance of the 
Christian religion may not be restricted to the re-
demption and salvation of a few souls. 
The religious life does have its own content and 
an independent value. It remains the center, the 
heart, the hearth, out of which all his [i.e., the 
Christian’s] thought and action proceeds and from 
which it receives inspiration and warmth. There, 
in fellowship with God, he is strengthened for his 
labor and girds himself for the battle. But that hid-
den life of fellowship with God is not the whole 
of life. The prayer room is the inner chamber,              
but not the whole dwelling in which he lives and 
moves. The spiritual life does not exclude domestic 
and civic, social and political life, the life of art and 
scholarship. To be sure, it is distinct from these 
things, it also transcends them by far in value, but 
it does not constitute an irreconcilable opposition 
to them; rather, it is the power which enables us 
faithfully to fulﬁ ll our earthly vocation and makes 
all of life a serving of God. 
Here again Bavinck impresses upon his readers that 
the kingdom of  God is a pearl of  great price but, at 
the same time, a leaven. “Faith is not only the way 
of  salvation, it is also the victory over the world.”87
It is in that conviction that the Christian stands 
and labors – the Christian as he is pictured in 
the Scriptures, as he makes confession in the 
Heidelberg Catechism. Being reconciled with 
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God, he is reconciled with all things. Because 
he confesses the Father of Christ, the Almighty, 
Creator of heaven and earth, he cannot be narrow 
in heart or “straitened in his bowels.”88
A priest in the Lord’s temple, the believer is 
therefore king of the whole earth. Because he 
is a Christian, he is a man in the full and truest 
sense.89 
In complete agreement with the Reformers, 
Bavinck holds that we must exercise our Christian 
faith, in the ﬁ rst place, in the faithful fulﬁ llment of 
our earthly vocation:
Roman Catholicism sees the full realization of the 
Christian ideal of life in the monk, in the man who 
leaves his natural vocation and devotes himself ex-
clusively to spiritual things.90
Moreover, Bavinck notes, “this conception has 
also had a profound inﬂ uence in our Protestant 
circles.” To this conception, according to which a 
person must do something extraordinary to be a 
true Christian and seems to be a Christian “to the 
same degree that he ceases to be man,” Bavinck 
takes sharp exception.91  Also in the practice of 
the Christian life, we must take seriously the fact 
that grace restores the natural. Continually and 
emphatically, Bavinck insists that the Christian is 
the true man, is truly human. As directed to non-
Christians, this meant: to be truly human, in ac-
cordance with your Creator’s purpose, you must 
have faith! As directed to his fellow-Christians, it 
meant: if you are a Christian, a Christian in the full 
sense of the word, then you are no peculiar, eccen-
tric human being, but you are fully human. To be 
Christian means to be human. It is man’s humanity
that is redeemed. In this connection Bavinck fre-
quently adduces 2 Timothy 3:17: “that the man of 
God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all 
good works.”92 Bavinck is fully conscious of the 
fact that the relation of “human” and “Christian” 
poses difﬁ cult problems, both in theory and prac-
tice:
We continually err on the side of the right or on 
the side of the left. One moment we sacriﬁ ce the 
Christian to the human, and the next we sacriﬁ ce 
the human to the Christian. On the one side looms 
the danger of worldliness, on the other side that of 
otherworldliness. Often the Christian life lurches 
on an unsteady path between the two. And yet we 
hold fast to the conviction that the Christian and 
the human are not in conﬂ ict with one another. 
Often we may not be able to discern intellectu-
ally the harmony which exists between the two, 
far less be able to demonstrate it in our lives; nev-
ertheless, we believe and we continue to believe in 
the reconciliation and agreement of the two. The 
Christian is the true man, on every front and in ev-
ery domain. Christianity is not opposed to nature, 
but to sin. Christ came, not to destroy the works of 
the Father, but only those of the devil.93
One day, however, the problems surrounding the 
relation of human to Christian will ﬁ nd their de-
ﬁ nitive resolution. This will happen in the status glo-
riae, in which the whole dispensation of grace will 
have served its purpose and will therefore cease. 
With this eschatological insight we will deal in the 
following section.
Man must first become 
son of God again, before 
he can become “a cultural 
creature” in the true sense 
of the word.81 But once he 
is son of God, he can also 
dedicate himself to culture 
again.
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Notes
1. Cf. E. P. Heideman, The Relation of Revelation to Reason in 
E. Brunner and H. Bavinck (Assen, 1959), who observes 
in his analysis of this theme (pp. 191ff.) that Bavinck’s 
idea “that grace does not abolish nature, but renews 
and restores it…may be called the central thought of 
Bavinck’s theology” (p. 196).
2. De offerande des lofs (11th impression, Kampen, n.d. [1st
ed. 1901]), pp. 44f. 
3. The Philosophy of Revelation (Grand Rapids, 1953), p. 
243 (Dutch: p. 208). For a general indication of 
the problematics cf. also De vrouw in de hedendaagsche 
maatschappij (Kampen, 1918), p. 28, and “Calvin and 
common grace,” in Calvin and the Reformation (London 
and Edinburgh, 1909), pp. 99f., as well as the ﬁ fth 
thesis of a lecture on creation and re-creation, an 
extensive report of which appeared in De Heraut, no. 
1037 (Nov. 7, 1897). This report was reprinted in De 
Bazuin XLV, 47 (Nov. 19, 1897). The theses of this 
lecture are particularly instructive for the nature/grace 
theme.
4. De Bazuin XLVIII, 12 (March 23, 1900). Cf. also 
Offerande des lofs, p. 45.
5. “De Theologie van Albrecht Ritschl,” Theologische 
Studiën VI (1888), 397. Emphasis added. Later, in his 
Dogmatics (IV 703), Bavinck still says that Ritschl’s 
accentuation of the “diesseitige Weltstellung des 
Menschen” represents an important truth over against 
the abstract super-naturalism of the Greek and Roman 
church.
6. For nutshell characterizations of Roman Catholicism 
and its doctrine see, apart from many passages in 
the Dogmatics, “Calvin and common grace,” pp. 104-
108; Het Christendom (Baarn, 1912), pp. 31-38; and
Bavinck’s “Algemeene Inleiding” in Kerkhervorming, 
commemorative volume at the fourth centennial, a 
publication of the Reformed Tract Society “Philippus,” 
1917, pp. 10-29. In these discussions also Bavinck 
deals extensively with the Roman Catholic view of 
the nature/grace relation. To keep the footnotes 
within reasonable limits we will hereafter refer 
only occasionally to these passages. Note Bavinck’s 
remarkable characterization of the Roman Catholic 
system as a “system of complementation”: “The 
Roman Catholic system, at heart Pelagian, is one 
great system of complementation; the image of God 
complements man, grace complements nature, the 
evangelical counsels complement the moral precepts. 
Moreover, this system continues within Christianity: 
Paul complements Christ, the mass complements 
his sacriﬁ ce, tradition complements the Scriptures, 
human ordinance complements God’s command, 
love complements faith, the merits of the saints 
complement the shortcomings of the weak.” De 
katholiciteit van christendom en kerk (Kampen, 1888), p. 
20 [ET 229-230]. 
7. Ibid., pp. 9f. [ET 224]. 
8. Ibid., p. 17 [ET 228]. 
9. Ibid., p. 18 [ET 228]. Bavinck argues against Harnack, 
Hatch, and Sohm that not only the gospel but even 
the Christian church (at least in its ﬁ rst period) was 
not ascetic. See “Calvin and common grace,” pp. 101ff. 
On asceticism in the early church cf. also IV, 330; Het 
christelijk huisgezin (Kampen, 1908), pp. 67ff.; Philosophy 
of Revelation, pp. 247f. (Dutch, 208f.); Kennis en leven
(Kampen, 1922) pp. 117ff.
10. Katholiciteit, p. 18 [ET 229]. 
11. Ibid., p. 19 [ET 229]. 
12. De algemeene genade (Kampen, 1894), pp. 20f. [ET 47]. 
13. Ibid., p. 22 [ET 48]. 
14. Ibid., 21f. [ET 47f.]. For hierarchy as basic idea cf. 
Het Christendom, p. 38. Bavinck writes in “Calvin and 
common grace” p. 107: “The whole hierarchical idea 
is built on the sharp distinction between nature and 
grace.”
15. De algemeene genade, p 21. Cf. Kennis en leven, p. 135: 
asceticism is always based on a Pelagian holiness of 
works.
16. Katholiciteit, p. 21[ET 231]. Cf. Ouders of getuigen 
(Kampen, 1901), p. 40 and Huisgezin, p. 71: “The 
Christian element does not permeate the natural, but 
remains suspended above it; the natural is not renewed 
but only repressed by it;…the leaven is spread out over 
the dough, but is not kneaded into the bread, so that 
it is leavened throughout.” Cf. also Bede en rede (with 
P. Biesterveld; Kampen, 1898), p. 39 and Bavinck’s 
review of Huizinga’s Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen [Eng. tr. 
The Waning of the Middle Ages] in Stemmen des Tijds IX 
(1920) 237, in which he says that Huizinga’s book takes 
us into a world of contrasts: ‘The supernatural and 
the natural stand next to each other in a quantitative, 
dualistic way, and cannot be reconciled. Each 
triumphs in turn. The harmony of life is missing; and 
both Humanism and the Reformation are attempts, 
each in its own way, to recover it. Cf. Christelijke 
wetenschap (Kampen, 1904), p. 19: in the Middle Ages 
the natural “was externally repressed, not internally 
sanctiﬁ ed”; cf. De algemeene genade, p.24 [ET 49]. See 
also note 18.  Bavinck’s analysis of the doctrine of 
nature and grace has undoubtedly had a seminal 
inﬂ uence on the analysis given in the philosophy of 
the cosmonomic idea, especially by H. Dooyeweerd. 
Dooyeweerd distinguishes four religious ground-
motives in the development of European philosophic 
thought : the Greek form/matter motive; the biblical 
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ground-motive of creation, Fall and redemption; the 
Scholastic ground-motive of nature and grace; and 
the humanistic ground-motive of nature and freedom. 
See H. Dooyeweerd, “De vier religieuze grondthema’s 
in den ontwikkelingsgang van het wijsgeerig denken 
van het avondland,” Philosophia Reformata VI (1946) 
161-179. As a contribution to the structural analysis 
of the classical Roman Catholic conception, Bavinck’s 
approach retains its signiﬁ cance to this day. Nor 
is its value diminished, in my view, by the intensive 
reassessment in later Roman Catholic theology of the 
questions concerning the relation of nature and grace. 
On the more recent Roman Catholic discussions, cf. 
M.C. Smit, De verhouding van Christendom en historie in 
de huidige roomskatholieke geschiedbeschouwing (Kampen, 
1950), p. 27ff.; G.C. Berkouwer, “Identiteit of Conﬂ ict? 
Een poging tot analyse,” Philosophia Reformata XXI 
(1956) 1-44; Karl Rahner, “Natur und Gnade” in 
Fragen der Theologie heute (herausgegeben von Johannes 
Feiner, Josef Trütsch und Franz Böckle: Einsiedeln-
Zürich-Köln, 1957), pp. 209-230.
17. De algemeene genade, p. 23 [ET 48]; I 330 [ET 1.360]; 
IV 470. On the juxtaposition of the natural and the 
supernatural order, as this shapes the entire Roman 
Catholic view of man, cf. De algemeene genade, pp. 
20ff. [ET 47ff.]. For the characteristically Roman 
Catholic tendency toward world-ﬂ ight on the one 
hand, and toward world domination on the other 
(both of which arise out of the same dualism), cf. I 
330ff. [ET 1.360ff.]; De algemeene genade, pp. 23f. [ET 
48f]; Verzamelde Opstellen, pp. 96f., Kennis en leven, pp. 
134f.  In Verzamelde Opstellen, pp. 96f. Bavinck writes: 
“Both were born out of a dualism between matter and 
spirit which is derived, not from Scripture, but from 
the philosophy of Plato, and which was transferred 
within Christianity, in proportion as it became Roman 
Catholic, to the distinction of the natural and the 
supernatural.”
18. Katholiciteit, p. 28 [ET 235]. On a number of occasions 
Bavinck pictures the Reformation as part of the 
emancipation movement which came to the fore 
toward the end of the Middle Ages; cf. Katholiciteit, 
pp. 28f. [ET 235f.] Bede en rede, pp. 39f.; Christelijke 
Wetenschap, p. 19, and especially Verzamelde Opstellen, 
p. 97. However, in these and other passages (e.g. 
De algemeene genade pp. 24f. [ET 49f.]), Bavinck also 
emphasizes the speciﬁ cally religious character of 
the Reformation, by which it differed fundamentally 
from Humanism. Cf. “Algemeene Inleiding” in De 
Kerkhervorming, p. 30: The Reformers “did not contend 
for the freedom of the natural, but of the Christian 
man,” cf. ibid., p. 7. Of particular interest is Bavinck’s 
criticism of the views of Troeltsch on Old and New 
Protestantism, and the difference between the two. 
The element of truth in this lies in the recognition of 
the fundamental difference between Reformation and 
Revolution. For the Reformation, in contrast with the 
Enlightenment, continued to move within the bounds 
of historic Christianity; it had no other concern than 
to restore this Christianity in its purity. Materially, the 
Reformation is closer to Roman Catholicism than to 
the Revolution. But Bavinck objects to the view that 
the Reformation in fact remained medieval. This is to 
fall into two misconceptions, in his view. The ﬁ rst is 
the identiﬁ cation of the supernaturalism of medieval 
Catholicism with the supernatural character that has 
distinguished Christianity from the beginning. The 
Reformation retained the latter, but brought about 
a fundamental and radical change in the medieval 
conception of the relation between supernatural 
revelation and nature. The second misconception 
consists in the failure to do justice, in this approach, to 
the originality and the signiﬁ cance of the Reformation 
(ibid., pp. 6ff., cf. also Philosophy of Revelation, pp. 3ff. 
[Dutch, pp. 2ff.]. This originality of the Reformation 
emerges especially in the fact that it replaced the 
quantitative opposition of the natural and the 
supernatural with the qualitative one of sin and grace; 
cf. I 331 [ET 1.361], IV 390f., Ouders of getuigen, 49f. 
19. “Calvin and common grace,” p. 127. On the 
signiﬁ cance of the Reformation for ethics, cf. De ethiek 
van Ulrich Zwingli (Kampen 1880), pp. 3ff.
20. De algemeene genade, p. 44 [ET 60]. 
21. Katholiciteit, p. 29 [ET 236]. Cf. Johannes Calvijn
(Kampen, 1909), pp. 33f. and Bijbelsche en religieuze 
psychologie (Kampen, 1920), p. 90: the Reformation in 
principle overcame the dualism of spirit and matter. 
On the healthy piety of the Reformers, cf. Katholiciteit, 
pp. 29f. [ET 237f.] and De zekerheid des geloofs (Kampen, 
1901), pp. 42f. [ET 38f.]. 
22. Katholiciteit, p. 30 [ET 236]. 
23. III 581 [ET 3.577]. 
24. III 582 [ET 3.577, where ‘another grace’ should read 
‘no other grace.’]. 
25. III 583f. [3.578f.]. On the Roman Catholic concept 
of grace in its opposition to that of the Reformation, 
cf. II 499ff. [ET 2.537ff.], III 513 [ET 3.517], IV 423, 
473ff., and especially Roeping en Wedergeboorte (Kampen, 
1903), pp. 195ff.
26. Katholiciteit, p. 32 [ET 237f]. Cf. also above Chapter I, 
section 3.3 and the present chapter 2, section 2a, note 
40. One of Bavinck’s criticisms of Calvin concerns 
the latter’s conception of the relation between church 
and state, cf. e.g. Johannes Calvijn, p. 24. On Bavinck’s 
preference for Calvin above Luther and Zwingli, cf. 
also, besides the passage referred to in my article 
“Calvijn en Bavinck,” Opbouw III, 15 (July 10, 1959); 
IV 390ff.; Our Reasonable Faith (Grand Rapids, 1956), 
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pp. 125f. (Dutch: Magnalia Dei [Kampen, 1931], pp. 
111f.), “Calvin and common grace,” pp. 11ff., 123 and 
especially Bavinck’s speech on September 22, 1892 
at the Fifth General Council of the Alliance of the 
Reformed Churches holding the Presbyterian System, 
held in Toronto, September 21-30, 1892. See the 
Proceedings of this Council (London, 1892), pp. 48-55, 
especially pp. 49ff.; cf. the account of this speech in 
V. Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck (Amsterdam, 1921), pp. 
215ff. Bavinck’s view of Luther is criticized by G.T. 
Rothuizen, Primus usus legis; studie over het burgerlijk gebruik 
van de wet (Kampen, 1962), pp. 47f., and W. Krusche, 
Das Wirken des Heiligen Geistes nach Calvin (Berlin, 1957), 
p. 98.
27. De algemeene genade, pp. 30ff. [ET 53ff.]. Cf. I 158f. [ET 
1.183f.], Our Reasonable Faith, p. 126 (Dutch: p. 112), and 
Het Christendom, pp. 49ff. On Anabaptism, cf. the places 
listed in the Register of IV and furthermore especially 
Roeping en Wedergeboorte, pp. 98ff., 145, 148f. Like Roman 
Catholicism, Anabaptism is based on the opposition of 
nature and grace: “The difference is that Anabaptism 
makes that opposition absolute and thus annihilates 
nature; Roman Catholicism “views the opposition as 
a relative one, and suppresses nature,” IV 396, cf. 415: 
Roman Catholicism does not look upon the natural as 
sinful, as Anabaptism does, but teaches that the natural 
is of a lower order; for this view of Roman Catholicism 
cf. also Verzamelde Opstellen, p. 97. For a comparison of 
Calvinism, Lutheranism, and Anabaptism, see Alliance 
Proceedings, pp. 52f. 
28. De algemeene genade, p. 33 [ET 54]. For the various 
movements mentioned in the text, cf. the passages listed 
in the Register of IV. On Pietism cf. also Zekerheid des 
geloofs, pp. 39ff. [ET 41ff.]; (see what follows in the text) 
and section 3, 2ff. below; on the previously mentioned 
Moravians, discussed together with the Methodists, cf. 
Zekerheid des geloofs, pp. 49ff. [ET 45ff.]. On Methodism, 
cf. also Roeping en Wedergeboorte, pp. 172ff.; on asceticism 
in Roman Catholicism, Anabaptism, Pietism and 
Methodism, cf. Paedagogische Beginselen (Kampen, 
1904), pp. 31f., cf. Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie, p. 147. 
Bavinck writes in IV 417: “Avoidance is the word of 
the Anabaptists; ascetism that of the Roman Catholics; 
renewal and sanctiﬁ cation that of the Protestant, 
particularly of the Reformed Christian.”
29. Katholiciteit, pp. 44f. [ET 246f.]; cf. the corresponding 
passage in III 571. 
30. Katholiciteit, pp. 47f. [ET 248f.]. 
31. De algemeene genade, p. 47 ET 62]. 
32. Katholiciteit, pp. 48f. [ET 248f.]. 
33. Cf. Katholiciteit, p. 49 [ET 249]. 
34. Cf. what Bavinck writes about the oration Katholiciteit
to his friend Snouck Hurgronje, as quoted in V. 
Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck, p. 147: “No doubt you 
have received my oration. Bear in mind as you read it 
that it is especially meant as a kind of antidote to the 
separatistic and sectarian tendencies which sometimes 
manifest themselves in our church. There is so much 
narrow-mindedness, so much parochialism among 
us, and the worst of it is that this counts for piety.” 
J.H. Gunning II, Het protestansche Nederland, 65, n.1, 
made the following comment about Katholiciteit: “One 
hardly believes his eyes if he reads Dr. Bavinck’s 
rectorial oration The Catholicity of Christianity and the 
Church (1888) and bears in mind that this beautiful, 
truly broad conception of Theology and Scholarship 
is being entertained and defended in the auditorium of 
the Kampen Theological Seminary. What will be the 
result in ecclesiastical practice if Dr. Bavinck’s students 
attempt to bring into effect these splendid principles of 
their teacher?” We would like to draw attention also, 
at this point, to the important judgment on Katholiciteit
made by H. Berkhof in his work De Katholiciteit der 
Kerk (Nijkerk, 1962), pp. 20f. After pointing out that 
the rise to dominance of the doctrine of the invisible 
church in the nineteenth century had led to a waning 
of interest in the visible church, and consequently also 
in its catholicity, Berkhof writes that Katholiciteit, to his 
knowledge, is the “only important exception” to this 
rule. “We ﬁ nd in it a genuine renewal of the idea of 
catholicity. The oration is distinctive, on the one hand, 
by its liberality and breadth, and on the other, by its 
modernity.” It is noteworthy (to make a parenthetical 
observation) that Berkhof fails to mention Gunning 
in this connection. Berkhof is correct in making the 
observation that Bavinck in his oration uses the word 
“catholicity” in a double sense – in the ﬁ rst place in the 
meaning of the contemporary word “ecumenicity,” and 
in the second place in the markedly qualitative meaning 
of “sanctiﬁ cation of the whole of earthly reality.” But 
a qualiﬁ cation must be made when Berkhof goes on 
to say that Bavinck’s oration has an isolated position 
even within his own literary output. It is true enough 
of catholicity in the ﬁ rst sense (Bavinck indeed has 
only isolated statements on the “ecumenicity” of 
the church), but it is not true (as this whole section 
demonstrates) of catholicity in the broader, qualitative 
sense. It is clear, however, that the use of the concept 
in this sense is concerned less with the catholicity of 
the church than with the catholicity of revelation, or 
of Christianity and faith.
35. De algemeene genade, p. 45 [ET 60]. 
36. Ibid., p 48 [ET 62]. This saying is also repeatedly quoted 
by Bavinck in the Latin form of the famous Thomistic 
thesis: Gratia non tollit naturam, sed perﬁ cit. On this thesis, 
as it functions in Roman Catholic theology, cf. O. 
Weber, Grundlagen der Dogmatik (Neukirchen, 1955-62), 
I 693 and II 582, who also indicates the possibility of 
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side is not missing. The cross may cast a shadow over 
all of nature, but the resurrection shines its light also 
over it.” Cf. “Calvin and common grace,” p. 101. 
53. III 280f. [ET 3.297f.]. 
54. Kennis en leven, p. 39.
55. Our Reasonable Faith, p. 325 (Dutch: p. 307).
56. De vrouw in de hedendaagsche maatschappij, p. 27. In 
rejecting dualism, Bavinck elsewhere mentions 
creation, incarnation and resurrection in one breath. 
In Bijbelsche en religieuze psychologie, pp. 57f., he writes: 
“Creation, incarnation and resurrection are conclusive 
proofs that spirit and matter, however they may differ, 
are susceptible to union and cooperation.” Cf. also 
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incarnation was given with creation. H. M. Kuitert, 
De mensvormigheid Gods (Kampen, 1962), p. 116, n. 
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for the incarnation.”
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cf. II 521 [ET 2.559]: “The body is no prison, but a 
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the nature of man as much as the soul does.” Bavinck 
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voor het sociale leven (1917), p. 4. On the rejection of 
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cf. Huisgezin, pp. 113f. Bavinck here (ibid., pp. 114f.) 
also draws attention to the naturalness with which 
the Scriptures speak about sexuality. They adopt the 
standpoint of a “healthy realism,” although on the 
other hand they also avoid all libertinism.
58. De algemeene genade, pp. 45f. [ET 60f.].
59. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 231, cf. 306f. (Dutch: p. 197, 
cf. 265).
60. Ibid., p 265 (Dutch: pp. 306). 
61. Christelijk wereldbeschouwing, p. 86; cf. Bijbelsche en religieuze 
psychologie, p. 90.
62. II 535 [ET 2.574]. Cf. Verzamelde Opstellen, p. 107: 
Christianity conceived of the disharmony in the world 
“as a temporal, occasional deformitas, and explained it, 
not in terms of the nature of things, of materia, but 
in terms of the anomaly, the anomia of things; i.e., 
not physically, but ethically.” For the non-substantial 
character of grace Bavinck’s comments on regeneration 
at IV 69 are instructive. Among other things, he says 
there, Christ is “not a second Creator,” but “Reformer 
of all things.” A good analysis of Bavinck’s concept of 
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using the thesis in another sense, ibid., I 471 and 639, n. 
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that this involves a certain modiﬁ cation of the original 
meaning; cf. F. H. von Meyenfeldt, “Prof. Dr. Herman 
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p. 9. It should be noted that Bavinck (as is evident from 
the foregoing) often uses the concepts Christianity,” 
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44. Cf. Offerande des lofs, pp. 43f. and Het christelijk huisgezin, 
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46. Bede en rede, p. 34. Cf. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 107 
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created things.” The recognition of creation opens the 
possibility for man of a “free and royal relation” to 
nature, devoid of both the deiﬁ cation and the contempt 
of nature. (Ibid. 105f.,  Dutch: 89ff. On the love of God 
cf. section “g” below.
47. Bede en rede, pp. 35f. 
48. Ibid., p. 40.
49. De a1gemeene genade, p. 47 [ET 61]. 
50. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 267 (Dutch: p. 229). On 
Christ’s appreciation of natural life, which he saves 
through His work of redemption, cf. Offerande des lofs, 
pp. 49ff.; Philosophy of Revelation, pp. 255ff. (Dutch: pp. 
219ff.); Verzamelde Opstellen, pp. 133ff.
51. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 267 (Dutch: p. 230).
52. Offerande des lofs, p. 52. cf. Katholiciteit, p. 10 [ET 223]: 
“Christianity is the religion of the cross. The mystery 
of suffering is its centre…. Nevertheless, the reverse 
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Ecclesia VI–VII (1940–1942). Articles XIX–XXV and 
XXIX deal with Bavinck.
63. Huisgezin, pp. 82f., cf. “Calvin and common grace,” p. 
128.
64. Verzamelde Opstellen, p. 149. Cf. II 538 [ET 2.578]. 
65. Verzamelde Opstellen, pp. 149f. Bavinck identiﬁ ed his 
position with the names of the two Protestant political 
parties existing at that time in the Netherlands, 
namely the Christian-Historical Union and the Anti-
Revolutionary Party. “Christian” refers to the constant 
standpoint, and “historical” to change, whereas “anti-
revolutionary” gives the additional qualiﬁ cation that 
the Christian-historical principles must be practically 
applied, not by means of a radical revolution but by 
a reformation which retains the good (ibid., p. 150). 
For an eloquent defense of reformation as opposed 
to repristination, cf. Christelijke en neutrale staatkunde
(Hilversum, 1905), p. 30.
66. IV 376.
67. De algemeene genade, p. 43 [ET 59]. According to Bavinck, 
the Reformed theologians had a better insight into 
this than the Lutherans; cf. the characterization of 
both standpoints in II 533ff. [ET 2.572ff.] and III 
582 [ET 3.577]. Cf. the objections of W. Trillhaas, 
Dogmatik (Berlin, 1962), p. 248, against the “Restitutio
nschristologie,” which he ﬁ nds, in a speciﬁ c form, “im 
neuen Luthertum, besonders in dessen bürgerlichen 
Ausprägung etwa durch die Ritschlsche Theologie.”
68. Cf. Berkouwer’s comments on the notion of “elevatio,” 
partially in connection with H. Berkhof’s objections 
against the exclusive defense of the traditional 
“restoration” theme (De wederkomst van Christus II 
[Kampen, 1963], pp. 267ff.).
69. III 163 [3.182]. 
70. III 582 [3.577]. 
71. Our Reasonable Faith, p. 144 (Dutch: pp. 128f.); cf. I 
347f. [1.376f.] and II 400 [2.436]. 
72. The impact of the basic theme on the doctrine of the 
covenant was noted above, under section 2.
73. Cf. IV 698ff. Bavinck’s entire eschatology could 
be considered an elaboration of what he says in De
algemeene genade, p. 46, about the Christian religion: “It 
does not make a new cosmos, but makes the cosmos 
new.”
74. Ibid., pp. 50f. The church does not stand above these 
life-spheres, as Roman Catholicism teaches, but next
to them. Domination over the church by the state, or 
domination over the state by the church are therefore 
both illegitimate (ibid.). S. P. van der Walt, Die wijsbegeerte 
van Dr. Herman Bavinck (Potchefstroom, 1953), p. 136, 
n. 18 mistakenly claims that Bavinck never uses the 
term “sphere-sovereignty,” although he advocates 
the conception itself. Bavinck not only advocates the 
conception, but on a number of occasions also uses 
the term; cf. Kennis en leven, pp. 48, 201: De Bazuin L, 15 
(Apr. 11, 1902).
75. De algemeene genade, p. 51 [ET 64]. Cf. Philosophy of 
Revelation, p. 258 (Dutch: p. 222): the Gospel is not 
opposed to culture, but is “the most important element 
of all culture,—principle and goal of what all culture 
in the genuine sense of the word strives after, and must 
strive after.”
76. De algemeene genade, p. 52 [ET 64]. Cf. above section 
“2d.”
77. On scholarship cf. Bede en Rede, p. 37 and Christelijke 
wetenschap, p. 121.
78. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 269 (Dutch: p. 231).
79. Cf. below section 3, 1 (j) aa.
80. Evangelisatie (Utrecht, 1913), p. 30.
81. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 266 (Dutch: p. 229).
82. Ibid., p. 242 (Dutch: p. 207).
83. I 332 [ET 1.362]. 
84. Offerande des lofs, p. 53.
85. Zekerheid des geloofs, p. 99 [ET 93]. 
86. Ibid., p. 100 [ET 94]. 
87. Ibid., p 101f. [95f.]. 
88. Ibid., p. 102. For this idea see section “2d” above. 
On the combination of faith and science, cf. e.g., 
Paedagogische beginselen, p. 52, and on faith and politics 
Christelijke en neutrale staatkunde, pp. 39f. 
89. Zekerheid des geloofs, p. 103 [ET 96f.]. 
90. On the Reformation’s revaluation of one’s earthly 
vocation, cf. Paedagogische beginselen, p. 96, “Calvin and 
common grace,” p. 123. Cf. also IV 703f. 
91. De algemeene genade, pp 48f. [ET 62f.]. 
92. Cf. e.g. Christelijke wetenschap, pp. 107f. and Paedagogische 
beginselen, pp. 30ff. (“the beautiful text”) and 49ff. (a 
very important passage for our theme). For criticism 
of Bavinck’s use of this text, see S.O. Los, Moderne 
paedagogen en richtingen (Amsterdam, 1933), pp. l73f. 
On the relationship of the christianum to the humanum,
Bavinck’s words in Paedagogigche beginselen, p. 50, are 
of interest: “Christianity and humanity are one.” In 
this context, Bavinck evidently means by these words 
that Christianity is the true humanity, not vice versa. 
Whether he accepts or rejects the converse (i.e., the 
idea that true humanity is ipso facto Christian) cannot 
be determined with complete certainty. For on the one 
hand, Bavinck says (Hedendaagsche moraal [Kampen, 
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18 leitmotif (German) – “dominant recurring theme”
18 Erlösungsreligion (German) – “religion of redemp-
tion”
18 reparatio – “restoration”
18 elevation naturae – “elevation of nature”
20 privatio – “lack,” “absence”
20 privatio actuosa – “active lack”
23 principium – “principle”
24 natura commendat gratiam, gratia emendat naturam – “na-
ture commends grace, grace emends nature”
25 status gloriae – “state of glory”
—
note
5 diesseitige Weltstellung des Menschen (German) – “the posi-
tion of man in this [earthly] world”
36 gratia non tollit naturam, sed perﬁ cit – “grace does not 
abolish nature, but perfects it.”
45 per accidens corruptionis et pravae dispositionis – “by the ‘ac-
cident’ [cf. p. 11] of corruption and evil disposition”
62 deformitas – “deformity,” “misshapenness”
62 anomia (Greek) – “lawlessness”
67 im neuen Luthertum, besonders in dessen bürgerlichen 
Ausprägung etwa durch die Ritschlsche Theologie (German) 
– “in modern Lutheranism, especially in its bourgeois 
expression, for example in the theology of Ritschl.”
92 ipso facto – “by the very fact”
1902], p. 51), “Humanity without divinity turns 
into bestiality.” Yet on the other hand, he writes (De 
welsprekendheid [Kampen, 1889], p. 64), “Whatsoever 
things are true, or good, or lovely among our 
opponents, whatsoever things are of good report, in 
whatever area, in the domain of art and science, that is 
Christian.”
93. De Bazuin L, 41 (Sept. 26, 1902). On the theme of 
human and Christian, cf. already De ethiek van Ulrich 
Zwingli, p. 1.
Glossary of Latin and Other Foreign Terms
page
14, 16 donum superadditum – “gift added on”
14  visio Dei – “vision of God”
15  foedus gratiae – “covenant of grace”
16  ut elevet et sanet – “to elevate and heal”
16, 20 per accidens – “by ‘accident’” [cf. p. 20], i.e. “inciden-
tally,” “non-essentially”
16 ex condigno – “by merit” 
16, 21 forma – “form”
17 gratia specialis – “special grace”
17, 23 gratia communis – “common grace”
18 Afgescheiden (Dutch) – “Secessionist,” i.e. belonging 
to the 1834 Secession or Afscheiding from the Dutch 
Established Church.
